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Abstract
Promoting homeowners’ preparation for natural
disasters is a critical component of building
community resilience. Adoption of protective actions
by individual homeowners could reduce the risk of
injury and damage to property; however, despite
extensive public education programs, numerous
studies report that households still are underprepared for natural disasters. The effectiveness of
gain-loss framing to nudge risk averse decisionmaking has been demonstrated across several
domains, yet the application of gain-loss framing
effects for natural disaster preparation has
concentrated only on policy-level decisions. A
behavioral experiment (N= 1,840) was conducted to
test whether gain-loss framing can be used to nudge
homeowner risk mitigation and insurance purchase
decisions. Consistent with Prospect Theory, results
indicate that a gain-frame is more likely to lead to risk
averse decisions to mitigate for floods and hurricanes,
but not for earthquakes. Disaster specific framing
effects for nudging individual mitigation decisions
provide unique implications building community
resilience.

1. Introduction
In the United States, natural and climate-related
disasters caused over $1 trillion in damage costs since
1980 [1] Even one single severe weather event could
result in massive destruction; for example, the 2011
Joplin tornado caused 158 direct fatalities, and
approximately $3 billion in economic losses [2].
Voluminous research has been conducted on the topic
of natural hazards preparation. Broadly, three
categories of preparation methods are used by civic
emergency organizations: warning messages,
evacuations, and adoption of protective measures.
Warning messages and evacuations can help reduce
casualties, financial loss and injuries resulting from a
natural disaster [3], and extensive research has been
conducted to evaluate the characteristics of warning
messages and evacuation decisions. Detailed
discussion of warning messages and evacuations are
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beyond the scope of this project; for a thorough review
of warning messages, see [4], and for a detailed
summary of evacuation research, see [5]. Another
important component of risk management is to
encourage residents susceptible to natural disasters to
adopt protective measures (such as storing food and
water or household retrofitting). Therefore,
understanding how individuals make decisions when
facing natural disasters can help emergency planners
better allocate resources and aid in the development of
more effective communication strategies.
It is often assumed that providing civilians with
more detailed information about hazards and
mitigation alternatives would encourage protective
action and reduce disaster-related damages [6,7];
however, previous literature has demonstrated that this
assumption is ill-founded in the context of natural
disaster preparation [8,9,10]. In one study, New
Zealand residents susceptible to volcanic hazards
demonstrated poor knowledge of risk mitigation
behaviors related to volcano eruptions, even after
multiple local campaigns about volcano hazards had
been conducted [11]. Furthermore, the authors
reported that knowledge about mitigation behavior did
not correlate with the adoption of protective actions.
Similarly, many studies also reported that adoption of
protective actions remained low, despite considerable
efforts on public natural disaster education [12,13,14].
Some scholars have proposed that the lack of
successful adoption of mitigation measures might be
linked to anticipated future beliefs and feelings
[15,16,17]. For example, surveyed homeowners in
New Zealand were more likely to take protective
action if they believe that preparing for earthquakes
would improve living conditions and property values,
reduce damage to homes, and minimize disruption to
daily life [18]. Others suggested that cognitive bias
also plays an important role in homeowners’ decisions
to mitigate natural disaster related risks. For example,
projection bias refers to a tendency for the decision
maker to anchor beliefs about her feelings in the future
based on her feelings at the moment. In the context of
natural disaster mitigation, since mitigation decisions
are typically made in advance before a disaster occurs,
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the decision maker might underestimate the likelihood
of encountering the disaster in the future and the
potential trauma the disaster can bring, which makes
the decision maker reluctant to invest in risk
mitigation methods [19,20].
The objective of our research is to investigate
whether manipulation of the decision frame for taking
protective action influences the likelihood of adopting
mitigation measures in the context of natural hazards.

2. Cognitive Systems Underlying Decision
Making Processes
In recent years, cognitive scientists have proposed
two distinctive cognitive systems underlying decisionmaking processes [21,22,23,24]. System 1 thinking
deals with behaviors that are more instinctive and
automated, often times the thought process of System
1 is unconscious, and only the final product of System
1 thinking is reflected in behavior. For example,
driving to work every day does not require
deliberation on every single step along the way;
cognitive systems can quickly and automatically
retrieve previous experience to guide completion of
the task [25]. Conversely, System 2 thinking governs
thoughts that are more abstract and require more
deliberation [26]. For example, if an unexpected traffic
accident occurs, System 2 thinking will step in and
consider alternative plans – will this delay my arrival
time? should I take a detour to avoid traffic?
Psychologists who support the dual-process thinking
systems argue that System 2 thinking provides an
evolutionary advantage as it can adjust to unexpected
or novel information from the environment [27].
The intertwined System 1 and System 2 thinking
can efficiently help navigate daily life; however, the
unique nature of natural hazards poses a unique
challenge for the cognitive system. Compared to
typical day-to-day decisions, for most people natural
disasters are infrequent and unfamiliar, therefore more
difficult to draw upon past experiences, thereby
impeding System 1 thinking. What complicates the
decision even more is that in the realm of natural
disasters, relying on previous experiences may lead to
highly suboptimal decisions, resulting in catastrophic
consequences.
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, residents
reported that one of the top reasons for not evacuating
was previous experience of surviving less severe
hurricanes unharmed without evacuation [28].
Furthermore, decision-making related to natural
hazards is complex in that engaging in mitigation
activities may impact many aspects of daily life and
may involve a substantial uncertainty. As an example,
consider a family that just purchased a home in

Southern California. The new home is located at a
seismic hazard zone, and the family needs to decide
whether to invest $5,000 in retrofitting their new home
or not. Southern California has not incurred a severe,
large scale earthquake since the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake. If the goal of this family is to minimize
future risk, retrofitting would be the ideal, utilitymaximizing solution. However, the decision becomes
much more complicated when considering associated
realistic uncertainties, such as:
1. It is unclear when and where will the next big
earthquake strike,
2. They may be spending money in preparing
for nothing,
3. The cost of retrofitting could be invested in
other ventures that might improve the overall
welfare of the family,
4. Retrofitting is only effective for a certain
time period,
5. What if they invested in a project that can
protect their property for 10 years and the disaster
occurred at year 11?
In decision theory, it is often assumed that a
rational person would choose the optimal option to
maximize her expected interests when all the
probabilities and consequences are known for each
available alternative [23,29]. However, this
assumption is rarely met in real life, and may be even
less likely to hold when making decisions related to
natural hazards. Past behavioral research suggests that
when facing such difficult, high-stake decisions
without sufficient information, people often resort to
relying on cognitive heuristics as shortcuts. Cognitive
heuristics, as defined by [30], refer to judging a target
by attribute(s) that come more readily to mind, while
ignoring other information that is more difficult to
retrieve. Since heuristics require less cognitive effort,
they are quite challenging to counter [31]. Moreover,
heuristics possess ecological validity in some cases
and can be used to aid decision making.
In their pioneering book Nudge [32], Thaler and
Sunstein proposed the concept of “choice
architecture”, which refers to the act of organizing the
context in which the decision is made so that the
optimal option for the decision maker appears more
appealing, thereby helping decision makers choose
better options. Using choice architecture to promote
better decisions has been studied extensively in the
health domain [33,34]; however, nudging individual
decisions for natural disaster mitigation by
manipulating choice architecture has not been
investigated empirically.
The current project focuses on utilizing one
particular manipulation of choice architecture, gainloss framing, as a way of nudging people to adopt
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protective actions. The following section provides a
conceptual introduction to gain-loss framing, a review
of previous empirical research on gain-loss framing
effects, and a framework for applying gain-loss
framing in the context of natural hazard preparation.

3. Gain-Loss Framing Effects in the
Context of Natural Disasters
Gain-Loss framing effects first originated from
Kahneman and Tversky’s concept of a reference point
in Prospect Theory [35]. A decision frame is defined
as the “conception of acts, outcomes, and
contingencies” associated with the decision maker’s
choice. Prospect Theory provides an account for
understanding decision making processes involving
risks, and postulates that for a decision under
uncertainty, when potential losses or negative
consequences of a decision are emphasized (defined as
a loss frame), people tend to be risk-seeking, whereas
when the potential benefits of positive consequences
of a decision are emphasized (defined as a gain frame),
people tend to be risk averse [35].
Tversky and Kahneman [36] tested this
hypothesis with a hypothetical Asian disease scenario,
in which respondents are told that a rare Asian disease
is about to strike and kill 600 people in the US. Two
programs have been proposed to combat the disease.
If the first program is chosen, 200 people will be saved
for sure; if the second program is chosen, there is a 1/3
probability 600 people will be saved and 2/3
probability that no one will be saved. The same
problem was then described in different wording. If
the third program is chosen, 400 will die for sure;
however, if the last program is chosen, there’s a 1/3
probability that no one will die and 2/3 probability that
600 people will die. Respondents were asked to choose
between two treatments.
In all four descriptions, the expected number of
people who die is 400; therefore, respondents should
either choose the sure thing option (200 people will be
saved for sure or 400 will die for sure) in both frames
or the gamble (where probabilities are involved) in
both frames if gain-loss framing effects don’t impact
decision making. If respondents are risk averse, they
should pick the sure thing option in both frames; if
respondents are risk seeking, they should pick the
gamble in both frames. However, results showed that
respondents were more risk-averse when outcomes are
framed as lives saved, and more risk-seeking when
outcomes are framed as lives lost, providing
preliminary empirical support for a gain-loss framing
effect.
We can also evaluate the Asian Disease Problem
by visiting the value function for Prospect Theory. In

Prospect Theory, the value function of a particular
choice is defined as losses and gains from the status
quo. In the Asian Disease Problem discussed above,
the status quo is the implied reference point for the loss
frame. As seen on Figure 1, the value function of
Prospect Theory is S-shaped: concave in the gain
domain and convex in the loss domain. This
asymmetry captures the effects of gain-loss framing on
people’s risk preferences. In the case of the Asian
Disease problem, reference point O represents the
status-quo, where no one is harmed and there’s no
outbreak of the disease. Since the number of people
saved is 200 across all programs, one can think of A
as the amount of people saved and A’ as the amount of
people lost. Point B represents the perceived value of
saving 200 people when presented with a gain-framed
message, and point C represents the perceived value of
saving 200 people when presented with a loss-framed
message. Since the value function for the loss domain
is steeper than the value function for the gain domain,
the perceived value for saving 200 people with a gainframed program is lower compared to the perceived
value of saving 200 people with a loss-framed
program, nudging people to be risk averse when
presented with gain-framed messages, and risk
seeking when presented with loss-framed messages.

Figure 1. Value function from Prospect
Theory

4. Mitigation Behavior vs. Insurance
Since mitigation behavior is also generically
referred to as protective actions, protective measures,
precautionary
behaviors,
etc.,
homeowners’
mitigation behavior is defined as any physical
remediation of the property recommended by
emergency management authorities (such as the local
and federal government, National Weather Service,
FEMA, etc.) that could mitigate risks associated with
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natural hazards. In the natural disaster preparation
literature, the primary focus is encouraging and
improving mitigation behavior.
Although insurance plays a vital role in ensuring
financial protection in the aftermath of natural
disasters in developed countries such as the US [37],
the uncertainty associated with natural disaster
insurance makes it challenging for people to adopt.
First, the process of both the insurance company and
insured individual(s) gathering information about the
opposite party is quite taxing. Second, the uncertainty
surrounding the impact of a natural hazard makes it
challenging for civilians to choose among the many
available insurance plans. Third, homeowners may
resort to taking mental shortcuts and relying on
heuristics when making an insurance purchase
[38,39]. For example, amnesia bias (the tendency of
making decisions based only on recent experiences)
and optimism bias (the tendency to underestimate the
probability of a natural hazard or consequent financial
losses) may cause residents who just experienced a
natural disaster without incurring any financial loss to
not renew an existing insurance policy [19,40].
Kunreuther characterized the challenges of mitigating
natural disaster losses using insurance the term
“natural disaster syndrome” [41], which refers to the
combination of residents’ limited interest in mitigating
risk, and the high financial costs incurred by insurers
and the federal government after a natural hazard
strikes.

5. Behavioral Experiment Methodology
5.1 Design Overview
Two variables were manipulated: message frame
(gain vs. loss) and risk mitigation (physical
remediation vs. insurance purchase). Gain-loss
framing is manipulated by shifting the reference point,
and risk mitigation versus insurance purchase is
manipulated by changing the scenario descriptions.
Risk mitigation methods described in the decision
vignettes were gathered from the NOAA’s
recommendations [42]. Respondents were randomly
assigned into one of the four possible combinations of
decision frame (gain vs. loss) and type of risk
mitigation (physical remediation vs. insurance
purchase).

5.2 Decision Vignettes
The decision vignette involves a hypothetical
scenario of selling a home due to job re-location. In
the case of hurricanes, since the property is located in
a natural disaster-prone area and recent forecasts
predicted an upcoming hazard on the way, the

homeowner in this scenario faces the choice of
whether or not to invest in storm shutters or hurricane
insurance. The time-horizon for the mitigation
decision is set at one-year, which allows specification
of meaningful probabilities of loss from the hurricane
hazard over a specific time period. This particular
vignette allowed realistic manipulation of both risk
mitigation strategy (physical mitigation vs. insurance)
and frame (gain vs. loss).
In loss frame conditions, respondents faced two
options: (1) spend a certain amount (on either
retrofitting the property to be hazard-proof or
purchasing an insurance for the hazard) on preparing
for the upcoming hurricane season (which is the risk
averse sure thing option), or (2) not spend any money
and take their chances (which is the risk seeking
gamble option). If they choose the gamble option,
there’s a probability that nothing happens to the
property, and there’s a chance that the hazard causes
damages to the property requiring costly repairs. In the
loss frame, the status quo is maintaining the current
state as is, therefore any amount the participant
decides to spend on preparing for hurricanes would be
perceived as a loss. An example of the loss frame
decision vignette for hurricanes for risk mitigation is
provided in the Supplementary Materials, Part A.
The gain frame used the same scenario with the
addition of one detail, namely, a new state regulation
requires the seller to put a deposit in an escrow account
to pay for any potential damages incurred before
transferring the property to the new owner. In the gain
frame, respondents faced two options, first, to invest a
certain amount from the escrow account (for either
retrofitting the property to be hazard-proof or
purchasing an insurance for the hazard) and receive
the remaining deposit back for sure (which is the risk
averse sure-thing option), or to not spend any money
and take their chances (which is the risk seeking
option). If they choose the gamble option, there’s a
probability that nothing happens to the property and
the deposit is returned in full, and there’s a chance that
the hazard causes damage to the property and none of
the deposit is returned. In the gain frame, the status quo
includes the expense of the required $10,000 security
deposit; therefore, any amount returned from the
deposit would be perceived as a gain.
An example of the gain frame decision vignette
for hurricanes for risk mitigation is presented in the
Supplementary Materials, Part B. Analogous decision
vignettes were constructed for both floods and
earthquake mitigation. The order in which the two
options (mitigate or not) were presented was
randomized.
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5.3 Gain-Loss Frame Manipulation
Manipulation of gain-loss framing was achieved
by shifting the reference point for a hypothetical
mitigation decision, while keeping the expected value
constant at -1000 (spending or losing $1,000) across
four conditions. For physical mitigation, the loss frame
(which is more intuitive to consider) involves a choice
between spending $1,000 on installing storm shutters
to prepare for the upcoming hurricane season, or to
choose to gamble, in which there’s a 90% probability
of incurring no damage from hurricanes and a 10%
probability of incurring damages worth of $10,000. In
the loss frame condition, the reference point is the
status quo of maintaining everything as is; therefore,
any amount invested on preparing for hurricanes
would be perceived as a loss.
The gain frame used a slightly different
description where the decision maker must first pay a
$10,000 security deposit in escrow; hence, any amount
received back from the deposit would be perceived as
a gain. Participants can either choose to use $1,000 of
the $10,000 deposit to purchase storm shutters and
receive the remaining $9,000 back for sure, or to not
invest in preparing for the upcoming hurricane season,
in which there’s a 90% probability of not incurring any
damage and receive the entire deposit back, and a 10%
probability of incurring damage and no deposit is
returned.
For insurance investments, the same manipulation
was implemented and only the descriptions regarding
hurricane shutters were changed to hurricane
insurance. As an illustration, Figure 2 shows the four
decision trees for each of the condition for the
hurricane mitigation context.

Figure 2.
scenario

Decision

trees

for

hurricane

5.4 Respondents
Respondents were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk, and each worker received $0.55 for
participating in the survey. The survey took
respondents on average 8 minutes to complete. Rouse
found that when attention check questions are used,
Turk workers provided more reliable scores [43],
therefore one attention check question was included in
each survey to filter out respondents who are not
paying attention or respondents who are responding
randomly. Respondents who failed the attention check
question were excluded from analyses. Three different
samples were collected for hurricane, flood and
earthquake respectively. A power analysis [44] with
power equal to or larger than 0.80 and sample size set
to be sufficient enough to obtain a moderate effect size
(d = 0.50) revealed that for a 2 by 2 factorial design,
for each sample, each condition must have at least 50
respondents (d = 0.527). Therefore, the target
population for each sample was set as 200
respondents.
For the hurricane sample, a total of 608
respondents (152 respondents in each condition) who
currently live in one of the hurricane-prone states
identified by the NOAA [45,46] were recruited. For
the flood sample, a total of 620 respondents (155
respondents in each condition) who currently live in
one of the flood-prone states identified by the NOAA
[47,48]. For earthquake sample, a total of 612
respondents (153 in each condition) who currently live
in California were recruited. In all three samples, < 1%
respondents were dropped due to failure to answer
attention check questions correctly.
Across all three samples, the majority of
respondents have previous experience with the
disaster (with the earthquake sample reporting the
highest percentage). The median age was 36 years and
55% were female. Approximately 2/3 currently own
their home (the rest were previous home owners or
soon to be homeowners), and 90% had attended (or
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graduated) from college. The hurricane sample
reported somewhat lower annual income and was
more politically conservative compared to the
earthquake and flood samples; the earthquake sample
had fewer current homeowners compared to the other
two samples. Details of the demographic variables for
all three samples are provided in the Supplementary
Materials, Part C.

5.5 Measure of Objective Numeracy
Since the decision problems used in this research
all involve understanding numerical values and
probabilities, objective numeracy was measured.
Foundational numeracy skills are necessary for
comprehending the risks associated with decisions,
and previous research in medical decision making
showed that low numeracy skills could impede
comprehension of health statistics [49,50,51].
Objective numeracy was measured using a 7-item
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT7) [52].
Respondents answered seven open ended
questions related to the construct of numeracy. For
example, a bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total; the bat
costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost? Scores for the CRT7 was computed by first
coding whether each answer is correct or incorrect and
then summing the scores. Each correct answer was
coded as 1 and each incorrect answer was coded as 0,
making the total range of scores 0-7. Cronbach’s alpha
for the CRT7 was 0.72 in the original study [52], and
Cronbach’s alpha for the current study was estimated
as 0.84, 0.80 and 0.78 for the earthquake, flood and
hurricane samples, respectively. CRT7 correlates well
with other objective measures of numeracy and was a
significantly better predictor compared to either
measures of intelligence or measures of executive
functioning for rational thinking tasks. The measure of
objective numeracy was included as covariates to
account for group differences.

5.6 Data Analyses
A 2 by 2 (decision frame by mitigation context)
logistic regression model with demographic variables
included as predictors was used to evaluate the effects
of gain-loss framing and mitigation versus insurance
purchase on risk preferences. Gain-loss framing
effects and mitigation vs. insurance purchase were
coded as -0.5 and 0.5 using contrast coding, and the
odds ratios obtained are therefore the average effects
of both groups. The same data analyses procedure and
coding were used for all three disaster samples.
Based on previous literature from Prospect
Theory [35], we postulate that respondents assigned to

loss frame vignettes tend to be risk-seeking and not
select the mitigation option, whereas respondents
assigned to gain frame vignettes will tend to be risk
averse and would select the mitigation option.

6. Results
Figure 3 summarizes the percentage of
respondents choosing the risk averse mitigation option
for hurricanes. Of respondents assigned to physical
remediation vignettes, 72.4% picked the risk averse
option when the vignette is in gain frame, whereas
65.1% chose the risk averse option when the vignette
is in loss frame. For respondents assigned to hurricane
insurance purchase vignettes, 68.4% picked the risk
averse option when the vignette is in gain frame,
whereas 60.0% chose the risk averse option when the
vignette is in loss frame. For both risk mitigation and
insurance purchase, distributions of risk averse
tendencies were consistent with the hypothesis that
gain-frame messages are more likely associated with
risk averse preferences.

Figure 3. Percentage choosing the risk averse
hurricane mitigation option by decision frame
and mitigation context
Figure 4 summarizes the percentage of
respondents choosing the risk averse flood mitigation
option. A total of 87.7% of respondents assigned to
risk mitigation vignettes picked the risk averse option
when the vignette is in gain frame, whereas 73.4%
chose the risk averse option when the vignette is in loss
frame. For respondents assigned to flood insurance
purchase vignettes, 77.7% picked the risk averse
option when the vignette is in gain frame, whereas
75.0% chose the risk averse option when the vignette
is in loss frame. For both risk mitigation and insurance
purchase, distributions of risk averse tendencies were
consistent with the hypothesis that gain-frame
messages are more likely associated with risk averse
preferences.
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predictors accounting for individual difference
demographic variables. (Detailed results of all three
regressions are presented in the Supplementary
Materials, Parts D-F.) With respect to gain-loss
framing effects, gain-loss framing yielded significant
main effects for both floods and hurricanes, but gainloss framing did not impact risk averse tendencies for
earthquakes. Respondents living in flood-prone states
and hurricane-prone states are more likely to be risk
averse when presented with gain-frame descriptions,
however gain-loss framing failed to elicit significant
changes in risk preference for the earthquake sample.
Framing

Figure 4. Percentage choosing the risk averse
flood mitigation option by decision frame and
mitigation context
Figure 5 summarizes the percentage of
respondents choosing the risk averse mitigation option
for hurricanes. Of all respondents assigned to risk
mitigation vignettes, 65% picked the risk averse
option when the vignette is in gain frame, whereas
71.9% chose the risk averse option when the vignette
is in loss frame, contrary to the hypothesis that
respondents will more likely choose the risk averse
option when presented with gain-frame messages. For
respondents assigned to earthquake insurance
purchase vignettes, 64.6% picked the risk averse
option when the vignette is in gain frame, whereas
50.9% chose the risk averse option when the vignette
is in loss frame, consistent with the hypothesis that
gain-frame messages are more likely associated with
risk averse preferences.

Figure 5. Percentage choosing the risk averse
earthquake mitigation option by decision
frame and mitigation context
Table 1 provides a summary of main and
interaction effects from the three binary logistic
regression predicting choices from the manipulation of
decision frame and mitigation context, including

1

Mitigation vs.

Interaction between Framing and

Insurance

Mitigation vs. Insurance

2

Hurricanes

Yes

Floods

Yes1

No

No

Earthquakes

No

Yes2

Yes3

Yes

No

1:

Gain frame was associated with stronger risk
averse tendencies.
2: Risk mitigation was associated with stronger risk
averse tendencies.
3: Mitigation versus insurance moderates the gain-loss
framing effect: gain frame was associated with more
risk averse tendencies for insurance purchase, but
the opposite effect was observed for risk mitigation.

Table 1. Summary of binary logistic
regression model results for each disaster
mitigation vignette.

7. Discussion
Results demonstrate that gain-loss framing effects
are effective in nudging people toward risk averse
preferences for insurance purchases for all three
natural disasters (floods, hurricanes and earthquakes),
and for physical remediation investments for floods
and hurricanes, but not for earthquake remediation.
The lack of framing effect for earthquake mitigation
might be a result of an overall disbelief in the efficacy
of earthquake retrofitting measures. Results also
suggest that respondents from earthquake and
hurricane prone states are more likely to adopt
retrofitting as a precaution measure, yet participants at
risk for floods did not exhibit any preference for
insurance vs. physical remediation. Overall, results
from the current experiment offer insights for policy
makers, suggesting that the effectiveness of gain-loss
framing and preference for risk mitigation versus
insurance purchase dependent on the disaster context.
With respect to risk mitigation versus insurance
purchase, Table 1 indicates that participants at risk for
hurricanes and earthquakes preferred to structurally
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mitigate than to purchase insurance, but this
preference was not evident for residents at risk for
floods. Specifically, respondents living in states that
are at risk for hurricanes and earthquakes are more
likely to select risk averse options when presented
with risk mitigation options than insurance purchase
options, yet no significant difference was observed for
the flood sample. These results suggest that the
preference of mitigating risk through structural
retrofitting or purchasing insurance might be context
dependent. The indifference toward flood insurance
from respondents living in flood-prone states could
potentially be explained by the lack of low cost and
convenient insurance plans [41,53].
Previous research in the realm of flood insurance
have proposed various methods for designing an
affordable and reliable insurance policy; however,
private insurance agencies are not motivated to offer
competitive flood coverage due to low market
penetration, making the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) established by the U.S. government
the only long-lasting widely available insurance plan
for more than 40 years [37,53,54]. However, NFIP is
only made available if the community where the
decision maker currently resides in agree to adopt
required flood mitigation and land use measures
[37,53], whereas for earthquakes and hurricanes,
numerous insurance plans are available on the market
without the requirement of community participation
[55,56]. This finding points to the need for flood
insurance education campaigns and the importance of
providing more diversified flood insurance options.
Regarding the interaction between gain-loss
framing and preparation context, Table 1 indicates that
only the earthquake context yielded a significant
interaction between framing and risk mitigation versus
insurance purchase, however no main effects of
framing and risk mitigation versus insurance were
detected. Results demonstrated that participants prone
to seismic risks are more likely to be risk averse when
presented with earthquake insurance options using
gain-frames than loss frames. Intriguingly, the
direction of effect for gain-loss framing is consistent
with Prospect Theory for earthquake insurance
purchases, but opposite for risk mitigation. For
earthquake risk mitigation decisions, respondents are
more likely to be risk averse under the loss frame than
the gain frame. For earthquake insurance purchase
decisions, respondents tend to be risk averse under the
gain frame than the loss frame. Since gain loss framing
effects were detected in predicted direction for
hurricanes and floods in both mitigation and insurance
investment context and for earthquakes only in
insurance investment context, results indicate that
earthquake mitigation measures might be different.

8. Limitations and Future Research
First, the mitigation decision vignettes are
hypothetical. Although the decision vignettes used in
the current study are realistic and results demonstrated
the experimental manipulations were effective, there
were no consequences following the respondents’
decisions. The monetary consequences described in
the scenarios were hypothetical and the gambles
described were not resolved. Future research could
explore whether incentivizing decisions impact risk
attitudes.
Second, social stakeholder perceptions are
theorized as one of the three core elements in the
decision-making process of protective actions [57,58].
Social stakeholders involved in natural disaster
preparation decisions are defined as authorities
(government), emergency management agencies (such
as National weather service), watchdogs (media,
environmental groups), employers and households
[59,60]. Social influences could come from
psychologically closer sources than those provided in
the current scenarios, such as neighbors, friends and
family members. Households located in counties that
require installation of hurricane shutters have shutters
of significantly better quality [61]. Similarly, residents
are much more likely to adopt earthquake prevention
adjustments if other people are participating in such
programs [62]. Therefore, future research could
explore whether the psychological distance of social
stakeholders plays a role in influencing people’s
willingness to mitigate risk. If at-risk populations are
more likely to be influenced by social stakeholders
they feel close to and trust, then policy makers could
consider targeting specific neighborhoods and
encourage residents to relay relevant information to
family and friends to improve compliance with
recommended protective actions.

9. Conclusions
This study provides empirical evidence regarding
the effects of individual level gain-loss framing on
mitigation and insurance purchase decisions for
natural disasters. Findings from the experiment are
meaningful because they:
1. Provide empirical evidence supporting the
hypothesis that gain-loss framing effects previously
reported at the policy or organizational level do
generalize to gain-loss framing effects for individual
and household decisions;
2. Demonstrate the generalizability and
robustness of gain-loss framing effects across different
natural disasters and both physical mitigation and
insurance purchase decisions;
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3. Highlight the integral role of context
dependency in framing mitigation decisions,
indicating that policy makers should consider unique
attributes of each natural disaster and tailor the
decision frame accordingly in order to nudge
individual decision makers to more prudent, riskaverse options.
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